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Some Climate Change Ironies: Deconstruction,
Environmental Politics and the Closure
of Ecocriticism
Timothy Clark
Abstract. This paper considers the deconstructive force of climate
change in intellectual and political life, especially as it undermines and
challenges the terms of consumer democracy and the liberal tradition in
political thought. The first half of the paper gauges this deconstructive
force in relation to Derrida’s legacy, arguing that environmental
questions open an arena of deconstructive events foreclosed in
Derrida’s own work. The second half considers the deconstructive
force of climate change in relation to literary ecocriticism, the study
of literature and the environment.
‘I’m not against motorists. It is a matter of individual right. Within the
privacy of their own homes, everyone should be free to drive a private
car as far as they like.’
Climate Change as Deconstruction
Is there something a bit suspicious in the ease with which one can
adapt an account of the challenges posed by climate change to some
now familiar Derridian arguments? We could describe the current
state of the world as a generalisation of the condition of aporia
in countless domains of life and thought, many never previously
conceived as political or as involving decisions of much consequence
at all (e.g. use of air conditioning) and so, one might continue, we
are presented at every turn with a situation no longer intelligible in
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terms programmable by the past, one, that is, now calling for genuine
decision and responsibility amid the incalculable which is both their
condition and moral necessity. In thus forcing a drastic rethink of the
terms of innumerable inherited practices and thought, climate change
could be said to open a new space for reconsideration and invention,
etc. However, in 2010, this all seems in danger of stating the obvious.
To lay out some formal characteristics of a mode of thought and
action is only a step. Geoffrey Bennington reminds us:
Derrida’s regular appeals to the need for invention in the
fields of ethics or politics necessarily disappoint: we would
obviously like to be told what to invent— at which point we
would be released from the responsibility of invention. . . .1
Following this, it may be a sign of a stagnation encroaching upon
deconstructive thinking that, if asked to respond to the challenge of an
issue such as climate change never considered by Derrida, for many the
reflex would be to argue, somehow, how well he had covered it already.
In fact, environmental questions look like a perplexing and seemingly
expanding absence or even evasion in Derrida’s thinking, one it is still
hard to know how to understand or address.2
The kind of invention demanded would presumably be less a
matter of the reading of some text, argument or cultural legacy
than of the keeping pace intellectually with an event whose scale,
complexity and incalculability is such as to resist representation
or being conceptualised. Climate change seems a happening whose
trauma is to enact or entail the deconstruction of multiple frames
of reference in multiple fields and modes of thought at the same
time (e.g. politics, economics, ethics, cultural history, urban planning).
Leigh Glover argues that climate change marks the ‘end of modernity,’
defining ‘modernity’ as the assumption that the natural world exists
for human ends, the dominance of liberal-democratic systems of
government embedded in market capitalism, and the privilege given to
scientific knowledge as the solely reliable guide in managing the social
and natural worlds.3
A concept used often by Derrida during the 1960s, ‘closure’, may
be a better word than Glover’s ‘end’ (of modernity) here. Broad
awareness of even the probability of climate change marks a moment
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at which a historical epoch is discerned as such, in its closure, rendering
its intellectual structures both newly perceptible and philosophically
exhausted.4 The epoch whose closure is at issue is that in which
the finitude of the earth was ignored, discounted or forgotten. Its
closure entails a realisation of the surprising degree to which even
the most seemingly benign and trivial practices have operated on the
false supposition of an infinite earth, an inexhaustible externality in
both space and time— that natural resources (air, water, soil, and
tolerable weather) are free gifts; and, finally, that future time and the
terrestrial space can act as bottomless repositories for waste or for issues
that thinking wishes to avoid. At the same time ‘one does not leave
the epoch whose closure one can outline’ (12), and there is sense,
simultaneously, of change and of entrapment.
Climate change politics today is mostly the politics of closure in
self-denial, most obviously so in the case of sometimes unscrupulous
attempts to throw mud on the climatologic evidence. Environmental
problems implicate huge and relatively new questions of ethics,
personal identity, knowledge, social justice, animal rights, the claims
of future generations, the value of the nonhuman, and the limits
of classical economics, etc., yet they have now been overwhelmingly
co-opted as primarily questions of better management. Over the past
twenty years a process of ‘ecological modernisation’ has sought to
normalise and internalise environmental issues into the workings of
industrial capitalism by making them issues of improved efficiency
and distribution. Environmental politics becomes recast as merely a
debate about measures such as pollution credits, carbon offset schemes,
improved energy efficiency and the supposed benefits of a greener
consumerism. To try to manage the planet’s atmosphere— a boundary
condition for life—by making it part of a carbon trading offset
scheme or of some kind of market looks like a peculiar variant of the
ancient fantasy of establishing some self-moving system of rationality
that can be master of its own conditions. A dangerous fantasy of
this kind is also arguably built into the basic mechanisms of liberal
democracy conceived as an institution for the procedurally neutral
representation of competing interests, for this means in practice pitting
the environment as someone’s ‘interest’ to be gauged in competition
with other ‘interests’. These is a general evasion of the contradiction
between a viable environmental ethics and the basic tenets and
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operations of liberal, consumer democracy and industrial capitalism,
their demand for endless capital accumulation (‘growth’).
‘Closure’ is here suggested in a sense supplementing Derrida’s
arguments about the ‘closure of metaphysics’, not as simply corres-
ponding to or instantiating them. Derrida’s readings trace in numerous
texts and contexts how a drive towards totality, purity or unity both
needs and denies conditions of contingency, otherness and difference,
yet his readings do not address the material finitude of the planet
as itself an encompassing site of deconstructive effects. For Derrida,
the included-as-excluded may manifest itself in logical incoherencies,
semantic and conceptual slippages etc. of a text or system of thought:
to these may surely now be added the event of a pervasive, impersonal
contestation of innumerable modes of thought, systems of production,
planning and government—of numerous human “constructions” of
the world (literally as well as figuratively)—newly highlighted as
inscribed in material contexts and systems which they only imagined
they could command or incorporate. ‘Isn’t there an element excluded
from the system that assures the system’s space of possibility?’ (Glas).5
A geographical and geological contingency, the finitude of the earth,
now compels us to trace the anthropocentric enclosure of inherited
modes of thinking and practice. The enlightenment project to render
all the elements of nature part of a calculable technics is made
to face its own dysfunction in the agency of what had previously
been excluded from reckoning, or, more precisely, in that which had
always been included-as-excluded. The condition of closure renders
anachronistic inherited economic, political practices and modes of
judgement without acceptable alternatives appearing in their place. The
epoch whose intellectual closure is now visible, the ‘flat earth’ epoch so
to speak, inaugurates the need to think a bounded space in which the
consequences of actions may mutate to come back unexpectedly from
the other side of the planet. The ‘environment’ is no longer thinkable as
an object of ‘crisis’ for us to decide on or manage:6 it ceases being only
a passive ground, context and resource for human society and becomes
an imponderable agency that must somehow be taken into account,
even if we are unsure how.
‘Deconstruction is what is happening’— this is Derrida in 2002,
listing various contemporary disruptions and dislocations in the human
world, ‘crises, wars, phenomena of so-called national and international
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terrorism, massacres that are declared or not, the transformation of the
global market and of international law’. Again no reference is made
to environmental/material issues or dangers. Derrida’s list remains
an anthropocentric and limited account of ‘the rhythm of what is
happening in the world’.7 This characterisation of ‘deconstruction’
excludes effects of non-human agency. The thought of climate change
means that, once again, we seem suddenly in need of confronting how
current modes of thinking and acting are inadequate or anachronistic.
In Derrida, the falsely circumscribed context of deconstruction’s
happening enables a far more manageable (if already ‘impossible’)
conception of what the political sphere is and the agencies that inhabit
it. Against this, the closure of epoch associated with recognition of the
finitude of the earth opens up or renders unignorable a new front of
deconstructive effects.
Derrida’s foreclosure may become apparent in one way in which the
deconstructive agency of the earth—using this singular term for an
incalculable material multiplicity—now ‘manifests’ itself in so-called
scale effects. The reasons for the scare quotes around ‘manifest’ will
become apparent. Scale effects are straightforward to exemplify but
impossible to apprehend in any particular individual case: what is
insignificant or trivial for an individual, say driving a car, regarded
by some even as a right, becomes a matter of social concern when
thousands and millions of people do it and at even larger scales it
becomes a threat to the integrity of the environment itself. Numerous
acts of individual unimportance or insignificance mutate into an
impersonal geological force. It is a matter of context, familiarly perhaps,
but here less in the sense that the context determining an individual
action cannot be bounded (‘no context admitting of being closed’ etc),
but, as the scale changes, of one action metamorphosing into another
one, and the trivial into the disastrous. Whatever one may think of ‘the
American of life’, it would be of little consequence if it concerned only
a few thousand or a few million people living at such cost. Extended to
the hundred of millions, however, it now becomes newly perceived as
a dangerous assault upon the global commons.
One difficulty is that, considered within the terms of current liberal
democracy, its remit bounded by national frontiers and conceptions
of state sovereignty, legitimated as a defence of individual right and
blind to scale effects, the global violence of ‘the American way of
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life’ becomes invisible. Climate change thus raises at a different pitch
the argument that environmental issues resist and question the bases
and assumptions of the liberal tradition in political thought,8 i.e. that
tradition which conceives the state primarily as a means to secure
the maximum autonomy of individuals within it on an egalitarian
basis.
Scale effects impose unprecedented difficulties of interpretation and
imagination which seem to exceed anything envisaged by Derrida:
of conceiving that even trivial personal decisions about food, ways
of travelling to work, gardening etc. all become significant or not
depending on the contingency of how many others have done, are
doing or will do them, anywhere on earth, implicating acts of seeming
irrelevance in incalculable impacts. On top of this, to consider scale
effects is also to multiply bewilderingly the number of things that
could—conditionally—be considered a significant ‘environmental
issue’. A list might include: day to day assumptions about life style,
the voting trends of various countries, the fuel efficiency of modern cars
and heating systems, population trends and sexual habits, definitions of
the good life, the nature of money and exchange, the aspirations of the
poor, the politics of national sovereignty, the impersonal demands of
‘advanced’ infrastructures that imprison their inhabitants in a kind of
‘energy slavery’ (William Ophuls),9 the size of households, the melting
threshold of arctic tundra and the exact nature of innumerable other
unknown or badly understood biological, meteorological and chemical
processes, and so on. Each issue in itself is made more problematic by
scale effects that render each of significance only in possible relation to
the others together, now, in the past and over an indefinite future.
Derrida’s political thinking concerns a ‘negotiation’ with conflicting
or contradictory demands in relation to the legacies in which we
find ourselves, those that would determine an identity, that involve
the giving or refusing of consent to conventional or legal statutes
or interpellations, or which relate to the borders and membership
of a polis (e.g. democracy). Foreclosed, however, was consideration
of innumerable happenings which are not conventionally decisions,
representations, or acts of refusal or welcome, the physical side effects
of, say, travelling to a conference to put one’s argument on these
matters, effects which, however tiny, may be immediately implicated
in possible action-at-a-distance across the planet.
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For Derrida a decision ‘worthy of the name’ of decision is one
made when procedural or inherited guidance on an issue has been
exhausted or breaks down and one risks the responsibility of a decision
outside given protocols.10 Yet the aporia— if that is still the word—
to be negotiated in this case is not a lack of plausible measures that
might reduce pollution in specific instances (e.g. different transport
systems, altered fertilizer use, population controls, revised modes of
accounting, a new anti-luxury ethic etc.) but that the global scale of
the issue, combined with scale effects and other uncertainties, derides
the significance of any one measure at any one place or time. Even
as the global stakes become higher, the term ‘decision’ must become
diluted almost out of all recognition in relation to the kinds of daily
banality implicated in climate change. For any individual, the situation
is simultaneously a generalisation, intensification and yet trivialisation
of Derrida’s notion of decision as a negotiation with the undecidable—
what is being decided when I turn on a light, buy a particular kind
of pineapple, or fly to a conference? What could a decision ‘worthy
of the name’ be in such a context? The very element that renders
some trivialities potentially disastrous in the longer term, the effects of
scale, necessarily includes the almost complete irrelevance of my own
‘decision’ at the present time. Yet the less my share of the blame, the
greater the overall responsibility.
Climate change seems a peculiarly monstrous cultural/political/
economic/ philosophical/ethical and scientific hybrid in Bruno
Latour’s sense.11 That is, the phrase works as a condensed cipher for
the destabilisation of such previously decisive dyads as nature/culture,
science/politics, fact/value. Collapsing the broadest upon the smallest
scale, merging the trivial and the catastrophic, its planetary scale
compels us to think and act as if already citizens of a world polity, even
as it undermines the credibility of any such thing. ‘Deconstruction’
in the sense identified with Derrida seems to undergo a new and
initially ‘deranging’ revision of its contexts, a variously disconcerting
or exciting upping of the ante. With the thought of climate change,
topics that have been the focus of kinds of deconstructive reading or
debate over the decades— the closure of Western metaphysics, the
ethical claims of nonhuman life, the auto-immunity of democratic
institutions, the limits of classical economic accounting, definitions of
the human, the conflict of the faculties, the concepts of borders and
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boundaries, the nature of responsibility etc.— all now seem put into
play at the same time. Charles S. Brown writes that ‘by defining our
problems as either economic or biological, political or philosophical,
we reproduce the structure of the academy, but fail to appreciate
the kind of essential interconnections that ecological thinking in
particular has emphasised.’12 Yet how to rethink next to everything at
once?
The second part of this paper traces deconstructive force of climate
change in relation to ecocriticism, the study of literature and the
environment.
Climate Change: the Closure of Ecocriticism?
That the closure of an epoch is not its end is a point familiar to
readers of Derrida’s Of Grammatology (1967).13 It also sums up the
quandary of world society after the farce of the 2009 UN conference
at Copenhagen. A condition of closure in self-denial characterises
the way Western consumer democracies, especially in Europe, have
now moved beyond any substantive ‘politics of sustainability.’ Ingolfur
Blühdorn and Ian Welsh argue that what now takes centre ground is
rather ‘the management of the inability and unwillingness to become
sustainable.’14
One effect is the proliferation of a merely ‘symbolic politics,’
political actions designed to appease and, effectively, to deceive—
deceive, that is, a public that in many ways prefers to be deceived.
Jens Newig offers an analysis of the various modes of and reasons for
‘symbolic legislation.’ Of particular relevance here is the following:
A socially relevant problem, for which at a given point of
time there is either no appropriate solution or only one that
entails short-term costs exceeding the short-term benefits, is
likely to be dealt with through symbolic legislation.15
The underlying rationale is not to deal with a problem, but to
manage the inability or unwillingness to deal with it. Newig refers to
a piece of symbolic legislation in Germany in 1995, the Ozongesetz
or summer smog act, a ban on high emissions from cars that was
widely supported yet quite useless in practice because of the various
conditions, thresholds and exceptions built into it. While many
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motorists supported the ban, few in actuality even respected the
temporary speed limits it introduced. In effect, the ban papered over
fundamental conflicts in those that supported it, between concerns for
public health and the freedom of motorists:
By symbolically integrating incompatible interests held by
the same individual, the Ozongestz successfully attended
to a psychological division within rather than between
individuals. It thus displays qualities of a tool of individual
as well as societal self-deception.16
Put another way, ‘we may glimpse the closure. I do not say the end.’17
How far is even the fast emerging critical school of ecocriticism
describable in terms of a condition of closure in self-denial? There is,
first of all, one striking fact to consider: that while climate change
is prominent in contemporary environmental writing and science
fiction, eco-criticism itself rarely directly addresses the topic in its
interpretations of literature and culture. It is mostly at issue only
obliquely or implicitly. To work through various extant anthologies
of ecocriticism is to draw a striking absence of work on climate
change. The only academic article directly on the topic of climate
change ever to appear in the leading ecocritical journal Interdisciplinary
Studies in Literature and the Environment is disarmingly direct about
its intellectual helplessness. Ken Hiltner compares the contemporary
challenge to that of air-pollution in early modern London, and how
John Evelyn misleadingly scapegoated brewers and dyers for a problem
caused by the general population:
perhaps the most important lesson to be learned from
[Evelyn’s] Fumifugium is that, when confronted with the
challenge of representing what neither reader not writer may
wish to acknowledge about their shared practices, the causes
of the environmental crisis may be misrepresented, though
perhaps unintentionally. . . it is a real danger brought about
by the challenge of representing a problem that nearly
everyone is causing, but that people are hesitant to confront
because they are unable to stop contributing to it.18
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Climate change and global warming do not appear in the index of
Lawrence Buell’s The Future of Environmental Criticism (2004).
Buell writes there:
Environmental criticism in literary studies has, thus far,
not changed literary studies or environmental humanities
so much as it has been increasingly absorbed therein. . . . its
durability so far rests on its having introduced a fresh topic
or perspective or archive rather than in distinctive methods
of inquiry.19
This seems disappointing and even surprising, given how deeply the
environmental ‘crisis’ might seem to question the inherited order.
One factor might be the domination of political and intellectual life
by modes of legitimation that appeal to the would-be ‘progressive’
liberal tradition. Richard Kerridge highlights this as posing a particular
challenge for eocriticism:
unlike feminism, with which it otherwise has points
in common, environmentalism has difficulty in being a
politics of personal liberation or social mobility . . . environ-
mentalism has a political weakness in comparison with
feminism: it is much harder for environmentalists to make
the connection between global threats and individual lives.20
Nevertheless, a vast body of ecocriticism reads as an attempt to address
environmental questions by linking itself to this usually individualistic
discourse of legitimation, however compromised it might be by also
serving as the ideological glue of market democracy, with its deceptive
hyping of individual ‘choice’.21 A lot of environmental criticism
becomes in danger of comprising a symbolic cultural politics,
analogous to that green consumerism which depicts the causes of
environmental danger ‘as a series of bad household and/or personal
buying decisions’ (Timothy W. Luke)?22 This is not just to make
the crude point that most Western ecocritics inhabit a lifestyle that
stands at best in a strained relation to their professed politics, that they
drive cars, fly to international conferences, and work in an education
system dedicated to enhancing the ‘competitiveness’ of their nation
states etc. The deeper issue may be the methodological liberalism
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of their thinking, for, like green consumerism, much ecocriticism
takes the individual attitude as its starting point and then argues
for a change in the choices which that individual makes. Thus, it is
hoped, the growth of an ‘ecological awareness’ through the study of
environmentalist non-fiction, eco-poetry or real ventures into the wild,
will be somehow sufficient to produce an ecologically viable society.
Such thinking effectively recognises that climate change enacts a drastic
reconfiguration of given distinctions of public and private but, without
more sustained work on the nature of the state, ideology, modes of
production etc, still seeks to engage it solely in terms of individual
attitude and choice. The focus on the individual, whether as green
consumer, a reader of an ecocritical argument, or as a backpacker,
reinforces the illusion that reality and power remain a matter of
individuals pursuing their rights and opinions (‘do you buy climate
change?’).
Another result is that green attitudes so easily recoil into a kind of
personal moralism:
the search for new ethical and political traditions . . . tends
to reduce questions of environmental ethics to issues of
personal conscience. . . it appears that concern for political
reform almost falls away altogether in the search for an
appropriate individual consciousness and lifestyle. . . 23 (Bob
Pepperman Taylor)
This can be called a symbolic politics insofar its unreality and political
naivety enable those who advocate it to demand changes they both
want and do not want.
Other ecocritical arguments are more sophisticated than the stance
of calling for changes in attitude. The issue of climate change, however,
does seem to present something so close to paralysing that even more
intellectually and politically astute kinds of environmental criticism
and politics seem to have become what Blühdorn calls ‘simulative
politics,’ a far more troubling concept than ‘symbolic politics:’
The theory of simulative politics replaces the negative,
defeatist— and very modernist— concept of politics as
a farce with the much more positive notion of politics
as simulation. It acknowledges, firstly, that in advanced
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modern societies comprehensive political ideologies—
including ecologism—are increasingly irrelevant, and
secondly, that the capacities of politics, i.e. of democratic
negotiation, decision and control, has become increasingly
restricted.24
A simulative politics is what emerges when it is no longer possible
to oppose a merely ‘symbolic’ politics with an supposedly genuine
or acceptable one. Simulative politics is the pseudo politics of the
condition of intellectual closure. In relation to the specific issue
of ecocriticism and climate change one could re-inflect ‘simulative
politics’ to name arguments that perform an involuntary anachronism:
inadequate, partial or insufficient readings offered in a context in
which acceptable alternatives seem not yet conceivable. This is to re-
enact the condition of closure. To describe ecocriticism as engaged
in a simulative politics in this context is not to deny that individual
readings—of representations of the nonhuman, environmental racism
or of bioregional ideals etc— are often valuable and desirable, like
efforts to preserve ecosystems or reform energy infrastructures, but
only to acknowledge the inadequacy of their scope in relation to
national and global contexts whose practices so overwhelmingly negate
them.
At the moment it seems still the more practicable gesture to turn
back on inherited modes of thought in view of their closure, their
strategies of evasion or containment. To draw a fuller map of the cul
de sac we are in may also be one step towards escaping the longer-term
threats, not only of environmental degradation, but also that of eco-
fascism.
Strategies of evasion and containment
1. Scale Framing. Environmental or eco-criticism evolved in the
tradition of romantic humanism primarily to address local and easily
identifiable outrages and injustices, the destruction of wilderness, the
effects of aggressive systems of agriculture on a bioregion and its
inhabitants, etc. . . Climate change thus challenges some green critics
with the fact that while they have been inventing ways to think and
act in relation to their national cultures and histories, they seem— like
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almost everyone else— still a long way short of thinking in the way and
on the scale demanded by an issue both so global and multiplicitous.
Habitual modes of thought, interpretation and action may emerge
now as constituted by a kind of now anachronistic ‘scale framing.’
Hilda E. Kurtz writes: ‘Scale frames are the discursive practices that
construct meaningful (and actionable) linkages between the scale at
which a social problem is experienced and the scale(s) at which it could
be politically resolved.’25 To this should be added the additional point
that to frame the scale at which one thinks a problem is also sometimes
a way of evading it— e.g. thinking of private vehicle use solely in
terms of individual right.26 An eco-critic going through the familiar
moves of praising Wendell Berry or Jane Brox as writers engaged
with an ethics of non-exploitative local dwelling and conceptions of
personal identity sensitive to requirements of other species, is, perhaps
necessarily, blocking off simultaneous consideration of how such work
is effectively nullified by the effects of atmospheric emissions on
the other side of the world, including even by numerous charcoal
fires from the poor in India and the far east. As Emma Hughes
writes of another example of scale framing in relation to GM crops
in Britain, ‘by giving people a boundary you are installing a sense
of agency or control; a discursive reconstruction of certainty is
provided.’27
Scale framing is a major issue in literary depictions of climate
change. The time scales at issue may challenge forms of narrative geared
to an easily identifiable section of lived human time. Kim Stanley
Robinson’s climate change trilogy, Forty Signs of Rain (2004), Fifty
Degrees Below (2005) and Sixty Days and Counting (2007),28 deals with
the issues of representation by depicting specific extreme weather events
in Washington DC as they impinge upon the personal, professional
and political lives of selected scientists and politicians. In other words,
the daunting scale and elusive agency of the issue is framed by a focus,
at the human scale, on moments of seeming policy decisions among
some people addressing the question of what is happening and what to
do. Such framing risks the bizarre effect that climate change is some
sort of misadministration, to be exposed, addressed—or evaded—
by the characters whose social conscience and morality is thereby put
to the test. It is in danger of becoming a disaster-as-test-of-character
scenario, a US-centric fantasy affirming familiar ‘human’ values.
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Ursula K. Heise writes, attacking the fixation in environmental
politics on the supposedly restorative function of the ‘local’:
Like other processes of global systemic transformation,
climate change poses a challenge for narrative and lyrical
forms that have conventionally focused above all on
individual, families, or nations, since it requires the
articulation of connections between events at vastly different
scales. . . . task of such magnitude that few writers and
filmmakers have attempted it so far.29
Literary texts or films have tended to fall back on the tired formulae
of urban disasters and apocalyptic scenarios (an impersonal variety
of the alien invasion), often with simplistic characterisation and an
evasively black and white morality involving conspiracy theories, evil
industrialists, maverick scientists or— like the film The Day After
Tomorrow—with plots that turn on acts of individual decision or
heroism that reinforce a culture of narcissistic individualism already
implicated in consumer democracy and environmental danger.30
With its multiple scales, more or less invisibility, global scope,
unpredictability and alarming menace, climate change seems more
germane to modes of representation that involve unfamiliar non
human agencies, multiple and perhaps elliptical plots. The situation
invites a writing that might be a form of secularised magic realism,
in which seemingly rational procedures and modes of thought and
representation interact with bizarre and counter-intuitive non-human
agencies, kinds of action-at-a-distance, with plural conventions of
characterisation, symbolisation and plotting. Heise suggests David
Brin’s Earth (1991)31 as an instance of the kind of structures of literary
representation that might be adequate to global environmental dangers
and quandaries.32 It does not actually concern climate change per se but
offers a science fiction plot of global disaster (the earth being consumed
by a black hole from within) conveyed through a multiplication of
fragmented narrative viewpoints and through various generic modes—
myth, epic and allegory— techniques that is, previously associated with
the urban novel of literary modernism (James Joyce, John Dos Passos).
(2) Multi-disciplinarity. If criticism and politics seem unable to
confront climate change it is perhaps because there is no simple or
Timothy Clark 145
unitary object directly to confront or delimit, let alone to ‘fix’ as such.
There is no ‘it’, only a kind of dissolve into innumerable issues. So it
may be that ecocriticism has been unable to deal with climate change
as a sustained and direct object of analysis because the issue is one that
refuses to stay put, dispersing as soon as you look at to it into multiple
questions, disciplines and topics, most of them at once outside the
sphere of literary studies, others outside the humanities altogether, and
many of them (e.g. family size,) only counting as ‘environmental’ at all
through variously hypothetical contextual and scale effects. In effect,
coming into contact with the issues of climate change, ecocriticism
considered as a distinct field or practice or reading may be as likely
to dissolve as a cube of sugar in warm water.
(3) The outmoded quest for a ‘liberatory’ method. Environmental
questions are plural, cross-disciplinary, contentious and often
mutually contradictory. The defining terms ‘environment’ or
‘environmentalism’ seem less coherent concepts than loose containers
for all kinds of issues that do not fit given modes of politics. It is perhaps
not surprising then that the desire for some intellectual certainty in
their stance has led to many ecocritics reaching for familiar modernist
categories. Greg Garrard describes the general stance of twenty-first
ecocriticism as tending towards ‘social ecology,’33 that is, towards
arguments that human violence against the natural world is ultimately
a product of oppressive structures of hierarchy in the human species.34
In effect, environmental issues can be held to be addressed by engaging
questions of equity among human beings. Thus it is today that, while
some environmental thinkers confront directly the difficult question
of clashes between specific environmental issues and the ideals and
norms of inherited thought (e.g. in liberalism), the majority of eco-
critical arguments now draw primarily on models of thinking taken
from oppositional politics in the modern, progressive/enlightenment
tradition. This general stance has been accompanied with an increased
attention to questions of environmental justice, ‘the right of all people
to share equally in the benefits bestowed by a healthy environment,’35
raising such important issues as environmental racism, the elitism of
the mainstream environmental politics, and environmental health as a
matter of social justice.
The environmental justice movement invokes visions of a just
society linked in part to the impetus of American civil rights
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struggle. Picking up this agenda in the late 1990s, ecocriticism gained
rhetorical appeal by seeming to extend the terms of that movement
to environmental concerns. Mapping environmental politics onto the
more familiar human justice agenda has also had some short term
intellectual advantages: critics can also bring to bear all the well-used
tools of mainstream cultural criticism, following its familiar method
of focusing on competing social ‘constructions’ of an issue in terms
of various interests and exclusions. A distinction of green criticism
becomes simply that it is competing constructions of the environment
that are being gauged. Ecocriticism thus rebutted earlier accusations of
a romantic anti-intellectualism and of the sacralisation of ‘wilderness’
to gain more immediate political relevance, at least in relation to
specifically human, local grievances.
Climate change, however, may mark the closure or exhaustion of
modes of environmental politics embedded in the modernist, liberal
tradition. Val Plumwood writes that ‘the green movement still lacks
a coherent liberatory theory,’36 but the blockage may be perhaps to
posit such a simplistic theoretical goal in the first place. As a possible
global catastrophe arising from innumerable mostly trivial or innocent
individual actions, including some which seem politically taboo, such
as increased material prosperity, an expanding population or increased
longevity, climate change does not present any one easily identifiable
antagonist. Its causes are diffuse, partly unpredictable and separated
from their effects by huge gaps in space and time. Climate change
entangles itself with other environmental problems that seem to present
no acceptable solution— the demands, for instance, of an expanding
population for new and safely inhabitable space as against the claims
to preservation of the habitats of increasingly scarce animals or plants.
Can western eco-critics comfortably inhabit a stance from which to
engage the environmental degradation latent in the hopes of millions
of people in the Far East planning to buy a first car? James Garvey
writes: ‘In a more than token sense, a campaign of civic disobedience
undertaken for meaningful action on climate change is nothing other
than campaign by us, against us.’37
Another danger is that the tendency to voice environmental justice
in the usual terms of a demand for equitable ‘inclusion’ is effectively to
legitimise the centre from which people claim to be excluded, i.e. not
to offer an alternative account of the social good but only to second
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demands for a fairer distribution of the spoils (‘the right of all people
to share equally in the benefits bestowed by a healthy environment’).
Whatever its strength in addressing local grievances, eco-criticism thus
becomes the covert legitimation of consumer democracy.
In sum, in relation to climate change ecocriticism, for all its
emerging promise, remains a simulative politics, a mode of closure
in self-denial. As a deconstructive force, intellectually inspiring despite
its horror, climate change still works to resist and open up the deep
assumptions, pious enclosures and disciplinary parochialisms of current
intellectual life, even as its pervasive irony mocks the destructive
complacencies of consumer democracy, trapped as it is in ‘the evident
contradiction between late modern society’s acknowledgment that
radical and effective change is urgent and inescapable and its adamant
resolve to sustain what is known to be unsustainable’ (Blühdorn).38
For criticism, there seems no off-the shelf oppositional stance ready
to be used or adapted, only a great deal of new work to be
done.
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